

CIA in UK

By Anthony Shell^{30th} September 2022 (amended)

[This work is dedicated to the memory of Dawn STURGESS.]

1 PREAMBLE

This introductory part of this report provides the context for an investigation into the events in Salisbury and Amesbury in 2018. In this investigation established techniques of complex data fusion and behavioural analysis have been used in an effort to produce the most rational and credible explanation of events.

To begin with, there is the official (UK State) 'narrative'. This (it is claimed by the State 'authorities') has been the result of the work of some 250 counter-terrorism police investigators, including their examination of: 11,000 hours of CCTV surveillance records; 1,702 witness statements; and 3,700 'exhibits':

"The Crown Prosecution Service has received sufficient evidence to authorize charges against two suspects including conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey; use of a chemical weapon; and causing grievous bodily harm to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey ... On Saturday 3 March, the suspects travelled from London Waterloo station to Salisbury. It is believed the suspects carried out reconnaissance before returning to London. The following day, Sunday 4 March the suspects again travelled to Salisbury, and CCTV images identify them at key locations around the city. It is during this visit that it is believed the suspects carried out the attack, before they returned to London, travelled to London Heathrow Airport, and returned to Moscow, Russia."^{1 2}

This, therefore, must require an examination of events prior to, during, and after the 4th March 2018.

Sergei SKRIPAL was living alone in Salisbury – with both his wife and son having passed away (of natural causes) after he had moved to the UK. The rest of his family, including his elderly mother and his daughter Yulia, were all still living in Russia.³ Yulia would regularly travel to the UK to see her father (and to visit her mother's grave and brother's memorial stone). It is highly likely that by the beginning of 2018 (at the very latest) both the UK and the Russian Government will have begun to suspect that Sergei SKRIPAL may have wished to return to Russia to be with his remaining family members.

Obviously, if such a return could have been arranged, it would have been a major political coup for Russia (and in particular, for the Russian premier Vladimir PUTIN).^{4 5}

¹ Source: 'Salisbury & Amesbury Investigation: Investigation Update – 21 September 2021', UK Counter Terrorism Policing

² The suspects being named as Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshrirov

³ Sergei Skripal's wife, Liudmila, died of cancer on the 23rd October 2012, whilst his son, Alexander, died of liver failure on the 18th July 2017. They are both buried (in named graves) in Salisbury Cemetery.

⁴ 'Russian Spy: Skripal asked Putin if he could return home', BBC News, 24th March 2018

In the months preceding the events of the 4th March 2018 the BBC Diplomatic Correspondent, Mark URBAN, had been making regular visits to the home of Sergei SKRIPAL (in Salisbury). Ostensibly, this was to enable Mark URBAN to gather material for his forthcoming biography on Mr. SKRIPAL.⁶

It would, therefore, be very difficult not to assume that the question of the possibility of Sergei SKRIPAL returning to Russia arose during those meetings. In that regard (and in regard to the possible sentiment felt by Sergei SKRIPAL regarding contemporary Russia), there is this very interesting reference (by Mark URBAN) to Sergei SKRIPAL's position regarding The Russian State and Russian geo-political strategy:

“He [Sergei SKRIPAL] is, or at least when we were talking in 2017, an unashamed Russian nationalist, enthusiastically adopting the Kremlin line in many matters ... He was adamant, for example, that Putin had not surreptitiously introduced Russian troops into East Ukraine [The Donbas], as much as the Western press reported.”⁷

It should always be remembered that Sergei SKRIPAL had been persuaded to work for the UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in 1995, when Russia had effectively turned into a failed, 'mafia' State, made possible through the machinations of the Western Powers (principally the US political / military class).

In 2014 a research article, written by myself, and titled 'The Ukrainian Context', was published by an independent UK newspaper.⁸ Within that article I described how – with the active encouragement and participation of the USA (Washington) and NATO – Ukraine became the European hub for the attempted conversion of both Russia and the Balkans (Serbia, Kosovo, Albania) into mafia-style gangster-states closely involved in the criminal trafficking of weapons, narcotics (principally heroin and cocaine) and people (principally girls and young women for a Europe-wide 'sex industry'). In addition to this, there was also the criminal, corrupt exploitation of the natural mineral resources of the region (especially oil and gas).

It was not until after 2000, after Vladimir PUTIN came to power, that that situation began to be reversed – with a gradual restoration of a sovereign Russia, a sustainable economic policy, the re-building of the Russian military forces, and support for the protection of a popular, traditional, conservative civil society.

Undoubtedly Sergei SKRIPAL will have been very supportive of the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014 – including for the Russian-organized plebiscite in Crimea and (as a result) its incorporation into The Russian Federation, as well as support for autonomy for the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of The Donbas.

It would appear that Sergei SKRIPAL was quite open (to his MI6 handlers) in expressing such sentiments.

Given such sentiments – and the strong possibility that Sergei SKRIPAL was contemplating a return to Russia. This would have been highly problematic (to say the very least) for the UK State, for the US (Washington DC) political / military establishment, and for various pro-NATO European countries.

⁵ 'Sergei Skripal's friend says the former spy wrote to Vladimir Putin to ask for a pardon saying he regretted being a double agent and wanted to visit his family in Russia', Bridie Pearson-Jones, The Mail Online, 24th March 2018

⁶ 'The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War', by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019

⁷ 'The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War', by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019, page 208

⁸ 'The Ukrainian Context', UK Column, issue 2, 2014

In the year prior to March 2018 Sergei SKRIPAL had confided to a close friend, Ross CASSIDY, that he believed he was under surveillance, and that his communications (including by mobile phone) were being intercepted. He believed he was being followed within Salisbury, and elsewhere within the UK.⁹

In February 2018 (one month before the poisoning) Sergei SKRIPAL transferred his power of attorney, that had given him control over his deceased son's £200,000 estate in the UK, to his daughter Yulia in Russia. Subsequently that money was transferred to a Russian bank in Moscow.

2 Actual Key Events

2.1 Saturday the 3rd March 2018.

At 14:25 hours Alexander PETROV and Ruslan BOSHIROV are recorded on CCTV, together at Salisbury Railway Station, having arrived on the 14:20 from London (i.e. departing Waterloo at 12:50 hours).

Almost concurrently, at 14:40 hours, Yulia SKIPAL arrived at Heathrow Airport on a direct flight from Moscow. She was picked up at Airport Arrivals by Ross CASSIDY and Mo CASSIDY, and Sergei SKRIPAL, in Ross CASSIDY's silver Isuzu D-Max (four-wheel-drive) pickup truck.

This arrangement was reportedly due to the 4-wheel drive Isuzu being seen as much more suited to the prevailing icy conditions of the roads (re. the 'beast from the East' storms of late February / early March 2018) that made travelling around the area rather difficult (even within parts of Salisbury).^{10 11 12}

According to verbatim statements, quoted directly from Ross CASSIDY, on the car ride back to Salisbury (from the Airport) it "became obvious" (to him) they were being followed by "a woman with bleached blonde hair and a man in his forties", in a black BMW car.¹³

Meanwhile, PETROV and BOSHIROV spent approximately 1 hour 50 minutes touring central Salisbury. However, there are apparently no records whatsoever of PETROV and BOSHIROV being anywhere near 47, Christie Miller Road, Salisbury (the house of Sergei SKRIPAL) on that day (no CCTV video footage, witness evidence, forensic / material evidence). Indeed, with the exception of the CCTV footage at Salisbury Railway Station, no information on the alleged 'reconnaissance' activities of the two Russians has ever been made available to the UK public (by the UK 'Authorities').¹⁴

⁹ 'Sergei Skripal was being tailed on the eve of the Novichok attack ... so was there a SECOND spy team?', by Nick Constable and Ian Gallagher, The Mail on Sunday, 9th September 2018.

¹⁰ It is evident that whilst, by the beginning of the weekend, a combination of a temporary thaw and salt spreading had cleared most of the roads of central Salisbury, the surrounding urban and country roads still suffered from significant amounts of surface snow and ice. Some of the rural roads were still impassable

¹¹ For example, some rural bus services had been cancelled, some roads had lane closures, and there were still abandoned cars obstructing some of the minor local roads. Sources include Twitter comments on Wiltshire Radio (BBC).

¹² The tourist sites of Old Sarum and Stonehenge had to be closed to the public. 'CCTV track Salisbury suspects', Sky News, Tuesday 9th October 2018

¹³ 'Retracing the steps of Sergei Skripal's would be killers', Luke Harding, GQ Magazine, 2nd July 2020.

¹⁴ Given the repeated requests for public assistance made by the UK 'Authorities' at that time, this is therefore seen as most surprising – and very problematic.

Obviously, if PETROV and BOSHIROV had applied a nerve agent toxin to the house at that time (i.e. 'mission accomplished') then there would be no 'rhyme or reason' for their returning to Salisbury the next day. And equally obviously, Sergei and / or Yulia SKRIPAL would most likely have not have been in a fit state, over the following 24 hours, to drive around Salisbury, go shopping, or to visit pubs and restaurants.

At 16:11 hours PETROV and BOSHIROV are seen together (on CCTV) at Salisbury Railway Station to (presumably) catch the 16:21 train – for a 17:49 arrival in Waterloo, London.

2.2 Sunday, the 4th March 2018.

The next day, PETROV and BOSHIROV returned to Salisbury, departing London at 10:15 hours, and arriving at Salisbury at 11:42 hours. They are recorded on the Station CCTV passing through the Station barriers at 11:48 hours.

The evidence apparently shows that they immediately began their rather brisk 1.3 Km walk to the SKRIPAL house, along Wilton Road (A36), passing in front of The Shell Garage at 11:59 hours, and – by presumably taking a short cut through a footpath opposite the Shell Garage – reaching 47 Christie Miller Road (the end house, within a cul-de-sac) at approximately 12:02 hours.

The UK State narrative is essentially this: upon arrival at Sergei SKRIPA's house, PETROV and BOSHIROV applied an extremely toxic nerve agent to the handle of the front door. Therefore this alleged lethal mischief was (we are told) performed in full view of all the possibly at-home occupants (it was Sunday lunchtime) of all the residencies, of that small cul-de-sac (including Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL).

No evidence has ever been produced to show that, throughout the morning of Sunday 4th March 2018 (and up until approximately 13:30 hours), that Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were anywhere other than at home. Specifically, in that regard, the biographer of Sergei SKRIPAL, Mark URBAN (a BBC Diplomatic Correspondent and researcher for BBC 'Newsnight') observed:

*"Yulia was insistent that she had not visited her brother's plot in the cemetery at all before the poisoning. That caused the detectives to re-think previous theories about the Skripal's possible movements on the Sunday morning – ideas that they had spent a great deal of time investigating. Indeed, the police would discard the idea that father and daughter had been out at all before they set out to have lunch in the town centre."*¹⁵

The preposterousness of the UK State's relentlessly fabricated narrative can be seen in this particular, important observation made by Sergei SKRIPAL's close friend (and frequent visitor) Ross CASSIDY:

*"Sergei's house faces up the cul-de-sac. He had a converted garage that he used as his office – this gives full view of the street. Almost always, Sergei used to open the door to us before we had a chance to knock. Whenever we visited, he'd see us approaching."*¹⁶

¹⁵ 'The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War', by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019, page 266

¹⁶ 'Sergei Skripal was tailed on the eve of the Novichok attack ... so was there a SECOND spy team?', by Nick Constable and Ian Gallagher, The Mail on Sunday, 9th September 2018. [updated]

Or, there is this, from Mark Urban:

*“Driving up towards the end of the cul de sac [sic], scanning the houses for numbers, I couldn’t spot his, 47. My momentary confusion ended when he emerged from his front door, directing me with military-style hand signals to park right outside the entrance.”*¹⁷

So, we are expected to accept, without question (by the UK State), that PETROV and BOSHIROV approached the front of Sergei SKRIPAL’s house without being seen from either the windows of the study or the lounge, or through the semi-glazed front door and porch. They then proceeded to apply a highly toxic nerve agent onto the front door handle of Sergei’s house, and then carefully (and safely) bagged-up their assassination gear for subsequent disposal – without being seen by the SKRIPALS, or by anyone else in that street – before leaving the scene (and still without being seen).

That house (47, Christie Miller Road) had (and has) a ‘through-lounge’, the front door and porch were (at that time) glazed from waist-high, and upward, and the study (the converted garage) had a large picture window looking out onto the street. With two people (at least) in the house (Sergei and Yulia) it is considered almost impossible that PETROV and BOSHIROV could have approached the house unseen.

Notably, the UK State narrative also contains no information or evidence of how (and when) PETROV and BOSHIROV returned to Salisbury City Centre. There is no CCTV video footage (or witnesses) that shows them walking back past The Shell Garage on Wilton Road (A36), past The Devizes Inn on the Devizes Road (A360), or (even) along the Churchfields Road to the south of Salisbury City Centre. And nor has any evidence ever been produced of their having used public transport (bus or taxi) for that purpose.¹⁸

Yet again, given the frequent calls by the State for witnesses, this is most extraordinary.

So what do we know?

Sergei SKRIPAL’s maroon BMW saloon car was seen passing by The Devizes Inn, on the A360, at approximately 13:32 hours, heading in the direction of Salisbury City Centre. We are told that Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL (presumed to be the sole occupants of the car) arrived some 4 minutes later, and parked on the top floor of Sainsbury’s Car Park, adjacent to The Maltings, at approximately 13:40 hours.

Approximately 5 minutes later, at 13:45 hours (note: corrected MPS–CTC time), PETROV and BOSHIROV were recorded on the Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV (near to Salisbury Clock Tower) whilst crossing the bridge over The Avon River, and walking along Fisherton Street toward Salisbury Train Station.¹⁹ They appear to have been in no great hurry – even stopping to take a photo, and window-shop on the way (as shown on the CCTV of the Dauwalders ‘collectables’ shop at approximately 13:48 hours).

¹⁷ ‘The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War’, by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019, page 199

¹⁸ Note that the Salisbury buses have CCTV recordings (retained for 7 to 21 days by the bus company, before being overwritten by new recordings), and taxis will have had hiring records. And both will have had direct contact witnesses (drivers and passengers).

¹⁹ The Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV is referred to by Salisbury City Council as the ‘Salisbury Clock Tower’ camera. Salisbury City Council has insisted that all of the city centre CCTVs were fully operational on the 4th March 2018. Source: ‘Investigators are studying high-quality CCTV footage of Sergei Skripal, says council leader’, The Salisbury Journal, 12th March 2018.

It is noted that the Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV video, provided to the public by the UK State (MPS-CTC), has been very heavily cropped – thereby removing any embedded date / time stamps. I have therefore determined that the UK State has also deliberately given incorrect timings for that video as well as for the Fisherton Street / City Hall video ‘frame grab’ (no actual video from that particular CCTV installation has ever been provided), that might support the State narrative (see Analysis section, later).

They arrived at The Railway Station at 13:51 hours, presumably having just missed the 13:44 to London. There is no evidence of their having left the Station, and to have gone back into Salisbury. It is assumed that they caught the next train – the 14:27, arriving in London Waterloo at 15.54 (this would mean that PETROV and BOSHIROV spent some 3½ hours in the London area, before flying back to Moscow).

We are told (by The UK State / MPS-CTP, and eventually by mainstream media) that Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL spent some 2 hours 20 minutes at various places within The Maltings area of central Salisbury – firstly, The Bishop’s Mill restaurant (between approximately 13.50 hours and 14.20 hours) and subsequently The Zizzi restaurant in Castle Street (between approximately 14.20 hours and 15.35 hours).

The problem is this is opposite to that reported by local eyewitnesses, who were very emphatic in saying that the SKRIPAL’s were at The Zizzi restaurant first, and only then went on to The Bishops Mill Restaurant, afterward.^{20 21 22 23}

There are also reports that Sergei SKRIPAL was in a great hurry to complete his meal in The Zizzi restaurant – demanding his bill, whilst still eating. He was reportedly very abrupt and rude to the restaurant staff. He was very much behaving as if late for an appointment.

Most notably, those reports include an observation by one of those eyewitnesses indicating that Sergei SKRIPAL first showed signs of illness in The Bishops Mill, after he has gone upstairs to the toilet, and just before he and Yulia hurriedly left (both without finishing their glasses of wine).

²⁰ “They are understood to have arrived in the city centre at around 1.30pm on Sunday. They had lunch at Zizzi, sharing garlic bread followed by a seafood risotto each. They then went to the Mill, which was sealed off by police on Monday.” Source: ‘Sleepy cul-de-sac house that became Britain’s biggest crime scene: Russian spy’s four-bedroom semi scoured by police as they probe whether they were poisoned there by nerve agent sent through the POST’, by Claire Duffin and Inderdeep Bains and Chris Greenwood, The Daily Mail, 9th March 2018

²¹ “The poisoned spy was unsteady on his feet in a pub less than an hour before he was found collapsed, a witness has revealed. Sergei SKRIPAL went for a drink with his daughter at 3pm at The Mill in Salisbury after eating at a Zizzi Italian restaurant. In the pub, they ordered two glasses of wine before Mt Skripal went to use the toilet. The witness, who did not want to be named, says .. ‘I didn’t really notice them when they came in’, he said. ‘They got their drinks from the bar and sat down. After a short time the man went to the toilet. They are upstairs. I noticed him when he came back down as he wasn’t walking properly. He looked like he was drunk. I thought the staff might ask him to leave. He came back to the table and didn’t sit down, he was and the woman just left straight away.’”, ‘Sleepy cul-de-sac house that became Britain’s biggest crime scene: Russian spy’s four-bedroom semi scoured by police as they probe whether they were poisoned there by nerve agent sent through the POST’, by Claire Duffin and Inderdeep Bains and Chris Greenwood, The Daily Mail, 9th March 2018

²² “The former Russian spy and his daughter ate in the restaurant on Sunday, about two hours before they were found slumped on a bench in the Maltings.”, source: ‘Traces of nerve agent used in Skripal poisoning case found in Zizzi restaurant’, by Rebecca Hudson, The Salisbury Journal, 10th March 2018

²³ “The Skripals had earlier had lunch in a branch of Italian restaurant chain Zizzi in the centre of Salisbury on Sunday. They are believed to have left between 2pm and 3pm and gone to a nearby pub called The Mill.” Source: ‘Russian spy Sergei Skripal and daughter Yulia poisoned by “very rare toxic substance”’. By Justine Davenport, Joe Murphy, Nicholas Cecil, The Evening Standard, 7th March 2018

At 14:55 hours a private CCTV captured Sergei SKRIPAL's maroon BMW 320 travelling North on India Avenue, toward the Devizes Road – presumably with the intention of turning right to go back into Salisbury.²⁴ That would imply a re-arrival in Salisbury City Centre at around 15:00 hours.

No CCTV video material has ever been released to the public, showing Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL in The Maltings area of Salisbury on that Sunday afternoon (or in any other part of Salisbury). This is despite the very large number of CCTV cameras in the area (local authority, commercial and private) – and despite repeated appeals by the police for the public to come forward with such evidence.

At approximately 16:00 hours an elderly man and a younger woman – later formerly identified as being Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL – were found in extreme states of distress on a park bench, opposite the Superdrug Store, within The Maltings area. The young woman initially appeared to be attending to the unconscious man before she collapsed against him, whilst the elderly man was incapacitated and apparently hallucinating.²⁵

Given that they apparently had had no opportunity to ask passers-by for help – or to call for an ambulance themselves (on their mobiles) – then it would seem that their onset of severe illness was sudden and practically simultaneous.²⁶

Among the first members of the public to witness that scene was Freya CHURCH who had just left the SnapFitness.24.7 fitness centre, in Market Walk, at 16:04 hours.²⁷ By amazing happenstance, another (almost immediate) responder was Colonel Alison McCOURT, the Chief Nursing Officer for the British Army. Colonel Alison McCourt was one of those who gave direct medical assistance to Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL (including helping to clear Yulia's airways).²⁸

Generally, the description of the persons on the bench was quite consistent: two respectably looking people – a somewhat older man, and a significantly younger woman. Whilst Freya CHURCH described the woman as blonde-haired, other eyewitness described her as being "*red haired*". They also described her as wearing a "*parker*", and that hood was up when Yulia was first seen (unconscious) on the park bench.

At almost exactly 16:15 hours an emergency ambulance arrived at the scene, having driven through The Market Walk pedestrian entrance to The Maltings.²⁹ Shortly afterward, a police squad car arrived carrying PC Alex COLLINS and Sergeant Tracey HOLLOWAY, who also provided assistance to Sergei and Yulia

²⁴ Sergei Skripal's maroon coloured BMW was caught, at 14.55 hours – on the CCTV installed at 75 Macklin Road – at the junction of India Avenue and Devizes Road, heading back towards Salisbury City Centre. The video has reportedly been dismissed by UK police due to its 'incorrect' time-stamp (on the basis that the time-stamp doesn't fit the official timeline narrative).

²⁵ As related by eyewitness Freya Church.

²⁶ It is claimed that one of the first calls to the emergency services was a 'silent 999' call, via a mobile phone. This may well have been an attempt by the man or woman to call for help. Source: 'The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War', by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019

²⁷ Shown as 16:03:35 hours on the CCTV of SnapFitness within The Market Walk.

²⁸ Those present, at that time, included: Freya Church; Oliver (Olly) Field; Daniel (Dan) Holmes; the McCourt family (Alison, husband, daughter and son); James (Jamie) Paine; Georgia Pridham; Destiny Reynolds; and an unnamed security guard.

²⁹ Shown as 17:14:50 hours on the CCTV of a café within The Market Walk. It is assumed that the CCTV system was displaying an uncorrected BST time tag.

SKRIPAL. Notably, whilst PC COLLINS was wearing protective (blue) gloves, Sergeant HOLLOWAY worked barehanded. The two police officers were subsequently joined by a number of CID officers.³⁰

Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were both taken to hospital by ambulance. And given the urgency of the situation, I would estimate that this must have been at sometime around 16:30 hours. Although an emergency helicopter had arrived at the scene at around that time, it was not used for either patient (although it would seem that the helicopter paramedics did join other paramedics at the scene).

Detective Sergeant Nick BAILEY also fell ill a day after the events of the 4th March.³¹

This provides for the essential foundation for the State / MPS-CTC narrative – most crucially it provided the basis for the following syllogistic reasoning: that the presence of that toxic nerve agent found in Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL must have originated at their house, and thereby providing for the identification of PERTROV and BOSHIROV (via the Wilton Road / Shell Garage CCTV footage) as being the likely culprits.

However, and most notably, whilst the symptoms apparently being presented by both Sergei and by Yulia SKRIPAL were of opioid poisoning, the symptoms presented a day later by DS Nick BAILEY were of both an opioid and some form of severe nerve agent or organophosphate poisoning.^{32 33 34 35}

DS Nick BAILEY described his own symptoms as follows:

“They couldn’t account, they couldn’t explain that my pupils being so small. But they basically gave me. At that point, kind of a clean bill of health. It was overnight Monday into Tuesday which was into the 6th March where it kind of took a real turn for me. I didn’t really sleep. I was sweating profusely. I mean, just dripping with sweat. I was having, how I would describe as hallucinations or very, very vivid dreams and nightmares.”

All three (the SKRIPALS and Nick BAILEY) were initially treated for exposure to (only) Fentanyl, after being taken to Salisbury District Hospital. However, this was quickly changed to treatment for (only) nerve agent poisoning.

³⁰ “‘We did our best’: police who rushed to Skripal scene tell of shock and pride”, Steven Morris, The Guardian, 14th December, 2018

³¹ [Wiltshire Police Chief Constable] ‘Kier Pritchard says DS Nick Bailey poisoned at Skripal House’, Rebecca Hudson, The Telegraph and Argos, 5th June 2018.

³² Namely, for opioids / Fentanyl; weak muscles; dizziness; confusion; altered mental state; clammy skin; pinpoint pupils (miosos); nausea; vomiting; extreme sleepiness; loss of consciousness; profoundly slowed heart beat; very low blood pressure; reduced blood oxygen; shock; dangerously slowed or stopped breathing; death. Sources: ‘Signs and Symptoms of Fentanyl Overdose’, DrugAbuse.com; ‘Fentanyl: Incapacitating Agent’, NIOSH, CDC, 12th May 2011; and ‘Fentanyl: A Briefing Guide for First Responders’, US Drug Enforcement Agency, undated; World Health Organization, undated; and The Harm Reduction Agency, harmreductionagency.org, undated.

³³ Namely, for Novichok: breathlessness; eyesight/hearing degradation; pinpoint pupils (miosos); loss of peripheral feeling; seizures; respiratory paralysis, bradycardia, coma, death. Sources: ‘Novichok agents: a historical, current, and toxicological perspective’, Peter Chai, Bryan D Hayes, Timothy B Erickson, and Edward W Boyer, Toxicol Commun, 2018: 2(1), 45-48; Novichok – The Notorious Nerve Agent’, Paul May, Bristol University, Molecule of The Month, August 2018; and ‘How German military scientists likely identified the nerve agent used to attack Alexei Navalny’, by Richard Stone, Science, science.org, 8th September 2020.

³⁴ Source: Nick Bailey, as interviewed by Andy Coulson, crisiswhatcrisis.com, 25th June 2021, series 4, episode 25

³⁵ There were no reported observations of Sergei SKRIPAL, or Yulia SKRIPAL, or DS Nick BAILEY exhibiting respiratory paralysis, whilst still conscious.

Again, there is a major problem. The initial reports were that DS Nick BAILEY had been one of the ‘first responders’ at the scene (the park bench in The Maltings) – including that he had given CPR to both Sergei and Yulia. Those reports apparently came from very reliable sources – including a close family member of Nick BAILEY, and also The Chief Constable of Wiltshire Police, Kier PRITCHARD.^{36 37 38 39 40}

DS Nick BAILEY would later tell a very much different story – that, although he did indeed attend the scene of the poisoning (The Maltings), both Sergei and Yulia had already been taken to hospital.^{41 42}

The attendance of DS Nick BAILEY actually seems to make a lot of sense, given DS BAILEY’s experience as a ‘plain clothes’ police officer in investigating drug crime within the Wiltshire area (especially Salisbury):

“And I had an opportunity then to work in a plain clothes tasking team it was, which was predominantly dealing with drug dealers. There was a spate of, as there is in a lot of areas, certainly rural areas and towns and cities, a spate of country lines drug dealing and people going from inner city areas and cuckooing in vulnerable people’s houses and using those as bases to deal drugs.”⁴³

During the suspected drugs related incident of the 4th March 2018 DS Nick BAILEY was on duty at Bromsgrove Police HQ – a mere 0.5Km from where the incident had happened.

One of the key parts of the (much later) State narrative is that Nick BAILEY was the first person to enter the house of Sergei SKRIPAL, and that it was his touching the highly contaminated front door handle that led to his collapse and hospitalization the next day. Indeed, DS Nick BAILEY has been very precise in regard to those events:

“And by this time ... much later into the night ... we’d been joined by the on-call Senior Investigating Officer who’d come down and decided we had to go into the house ... And this was much later into

³⁶ “A close relative of Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, 38, who fell ill after rushing to the scene, said that as well as tending to the victims on the bench where they were found, he was also among the first to enter Mr Skripal’s home a few miles away after the attack. She said he was at both places. First he was where they collapsed, trying to help them, then he went to the house, in that order.” Source: ‘Sleepy cul-de-sac house that became Britain’s biggest crime scene: Russian spy’s four-bedroom semi scoured by police as they probe whether they were poisoned there by nerve agent sent through the POST’, by Claire Duffin and Inderdeep Bains and Chris Greenwood, The Daily Mail, 9th March 2018

³⁷ “Sergeant Bailey administered CPR at the scene of the attack and soon became seriously unwell.”, ‘Russian spy latest: Hero police officer seriously injured by nerve agent named’, by Joey Millar, The Express, express.co.uk, 9th March 2018

³⁸ “Chief Constable Pritchard said yesterday: ‘I’m proud of all staff who attended this incident at the Maltings on that night. They responded to try to protect people who were ill, with limited information ... We can confirm that a Wiltshire police officer, who was part of the initial response, is also in a serious condition and receiving intensive care.’” The Express, express.co.uk

³⁹ “The first [police] officer on the scene, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey, aged 38, of Salisbury CID, remains in a serious condition”. Source: ‘21 people treated after Salisbury nerve agent attack’, The Salisbury Journal, 8th March 2018

⁴⁰ “A police officer in a serious condition after last week’s nerve agent attack has released a statement through Wiltshire Police. Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey remains in Salisbury District Hospital after coming into contact with a nerve agent while attending the scene where Sergei and Yulia Skripal were found on Sunday”, Source: ‘DS Nick Bailey releases statement from hospital’, by Rebecca Hudson, The Salisbury Journal, 10th March 2018

⁴¹ “... so yeah, went down to the scene, the two patients who we now know to be Sergei and Yulia Skripal had already gone.” Source: Nick Bailey, as interviewed by Andy Coulson, crisiswhatcrisis.com, 25th June 2021, series 4, episode 25

⁴² ‘Actions of DS Nick Bailey on the 4th March 2018 (Salisbury Incident)’, Peter Beswick, FOI request to The Metropolitan Police (MPS, London), 16th December 2018 [[The FOI request refused by The MPS](#)]

⁴³ ‘Nick Bailey on Being poisoned, losing everything and finding peace’, Crisis What Crisis? 25th June 2021, series 4, episode 25, 00:09:28:20

*the night. This was almost kind of midnight time by the time we went into the house. But we knew we had to go in, we had to check the house to make sure there were no other casualties and start to try and get an idea of what was going on. So yeah, so we kitted up in forensic suits and made our way to the address and that's the ... [Andy Coulson: And you're the first one in?] ... I'm the first in, yeah."*⁴⁴

Therefore, according to that account, the police delayed entry to Mr. SKRIPAL's house for almost 7 hours – despite their concerns that there might be other casualties inside that house. Why? However this was very different to what was being said (to the local press) by the local residents of Christie Miller Road, on that day (4th March 2018):

"Police arrived at Skripal's house in Christie Miller Road, Salisbury, yesterday at 5pm, according to neighbours."^{45 46}

Indeed, this is what I would have expected. I know (from personal experience) that if the paramedics of an ambulance are dealing with a person collapsed unconscious in the street, then they will (if possible) endeavor to identify the person by means of the person's mobile phone (to contact family or friends of that person). They will also look for cards or medallions indication an existing, medical state (for serious pre-existing conditions such as diabetes, for a heart condition, for medical prescriptions, for drug addiction treatment, for drug allergies *et cetera*). If the police are also attending the scene (such as in this case) the police will take possession of the person's car keys, house keys, and wallet (for identification purposes, to secure the car, to secure the house and the person's personal property, and also to attempt to contact family members).

There can be little doubt that within just a few minutes of the police being on the scene, the UK police and the UK security services would have known that the man slumped unconscious on that Salisbury park bench, on that Sunday afternoon, was the former Russian GRU Colonel, Sergei SKRIPAL – that is to say, if they didn't know already, of course (i.e. through active surveillance and tracking).

On the afternoon of the next day (Monday, 5th March) the Wiltshire Police Constabulary declared a major incident with two civilians (Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL) and a police officer (DS Nick BAILEY) having been exposed to "*an unknown substance*".⁴⁷ By the 8th March 2018, the UK Metropolitan Police Service (London) were informing UK mainstream media (and hence the general public) that a "*nerve agent*" had been identified as the poisonous substance that had incapacitated Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, in Salisbury, four days previously.⁴⁸ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the UK media immediately interpreted the term "*nerve agent*" to be a reference to a lethal chemical weapon such as (or similar to) Sarin or VX.

⁴⁴ 'Nick Bailey on Being poisoned, losing everything and finding peace', Crisis What Crisis? 25th June 2021, series 4, episode 25, 00:18:09:16 to 00:19:22:20

⁴⁵ 'Man found critically ill at Maltings in Salisbury man is former Russian Spy Sergei Skripal', The Salisbury Journal, 5th March 2018.

⁴⁶ Note that at that time (5pm) it will still have been daylight – with the sun setting at approximately 6pm.

⁴⁷ Wiltshir Police, 5th March 2018, 01:02 hours pm, Twitter, @wiltshirepolice

⁴⁸ 'What was the nerve agent used to poison Sergei Skripal?', Alice Klein, New Scientist, 8th March 2018.

Just eight days after the Salisbury incident (i.e. the 12th March) the UK Government's National Security Council was advising Parliament that Russia was most likely to have engineered the Salisbury attack through the use of a "*military grade nerve agent*", and that the "*military grade nerve agent*" used was "*from a family of substances known as Novichok*".^{49 50}

However, an April 2018 OPCW report in regard to the events in both Salisbury and Amesbury made public reference only to a "*Toxic Chemical*", whilst keeping the actual description of the poisonous substance a closely guarded secret.⁵¹ Therefore there was no OPCW public endorsement of the UK State's (and mass media's) description of the poisonous substance used in Salisbury poisoning incidents as "*being from a family of substances known as Novichok*".

Most oddly, the OPCW referred to the "*toxic chemical*" in question being "*of high purity*" and of having an "*almost complete absence of impurities*". Which begs the question – how could this be, for samples from a compromised crime scene?⁵²

Two days later, on the 14th March 2018, a letter from Dr. Stephen DAVIES of Salisbury District Hospital was published in The Times newspaper, in which he stated the following:

"Sir, Further to your report (Poison exposure leaves almost 40 needing treatment), may I clarify that no patients experienced symptoms of nerve agent poisoning in Salisbury and there have only ever been three patients with significant poisoning. Several people have attended the emergency department concerned that they may have been exposed. None has had symptoms of poisoning and none needed treatment. Any blood tests performed have shown no abnormality. No member of the public has been contaminated by the agent involved.
Stephen Davies, Consultant in emergency medicine, Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust."

That letter was quickly followed (two days later, on the 16th March 2018) by a Times newspaper article. That article was undoubtedly intended to provide 'clarification' to Dr. DAVIES' letter. The article stated:

*"Dozens of patients who went to hospital after the Salisbury poisoning were unaffected by the nerve agent, a doctor has revealed ... Stephen Davies, a consultant in emergency medicine at the Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust, said that no one other than Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey had needed treatment. The poisoning had prompted concern about the public's potential exposure to the Novichok nerve agent ..."*⁵³

⁴⁹ 'Russian spy poisoning: Theresa May issues ultimatum to Moscow', Anushka Asthana, Andrew Roth, Luke Harding and Ewen MacAskill, The guardian, Tuesday 13th March 2018

⁵⁰ The particular type of Novichok was not stated: Novichok-5 (a binary analog of the nerve agent A-232), or Novichok-7 (a binary analog of A-234).

⁵¹ 'Note By The Technical Secretariat – Summary Of The Report On Activities Carried Out In Support Of A Request For Technical Assistance By The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/18', OPCW, 12th April 2018, regarding paragraph 12, "*Toxic Chemical*".

⁵² The most significant forensic sample was taken from the front door handle of Sergei Skripal's house – but only after numerous people had gone in and out of the house.

⁵³ 'Russia: Salisbury poison fears allayed by doctor', Fiona Hamilton, John Simpson and Deborah Haynes, The Times, 16th March 2018.

On the 10th April 2018 the Medical Director of Salisbury District Hospital, Dr. Christine BLANSHARD, provided the first public statement with details of the medical procedures that had been used for Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, following their admission on the 4th July 2018. This included the following:

“While I won’t go into great detail about the treatment we’ve been providing, I will say that nerve agents work by attaching themselves to a particular enzyme in the body which then stops the nerves from working properly. This results in symptoms such as sickness, hallucinating and confusion.” ⁵⁴

The very important (and highly problematic) significance of those two statements, by Dr. Stephen DAVIES and Dr. Christine BLANSHARD (both of SDH), will be addressed within the Analysis section of this report.

In the days (and weeks) following the 4th March the efforts by the UK police were, almost exclusively, that of a ‘clean up operation’ – which was undertaken in a very ostentatious way. Therefore we were to see emergency vehicles, street furniture, and restaurant tables being removed, cleansed and / or destroyed. CCTV recordings were impounded. And potential witnesses were aggressively interviewed.

It was very evident that no serious search for material evidence was being carried out (i.e. for toxic chemical containers, applicators, protective clothing, cleansing agents, disguises, other weapons *etc.*). No storm drain gratings were lifted, no sewage manhole covers were opened, no shrubbery / undergrowth was cut down, and no streams or ponds were waded. And this was despite the constant police warnings regarding the life-threatening danger from the toxin posed to the public (including, obviously, to children).

Following the events in early March 2018 the only public appearance of the SKRIPALS was of Yulia SKRIPAL when she took part in a very stage-managed video, in which she was shown reading out (and signing) a pre-prepared, one-page, hand written statement. In her videoed statement she thanked the people of the UK (both members of the public and the SDH medical staff) for the help they gave to her and her father in surviving, and recovering from, their ordeal (the “*attempted assassination*” of them both). She said nothing of the persons (or State) being held responsible for the poisoning of herself and her father.

It was (and is) a somewhat disturbing video to watch. She was obviously being very closely directed in regards to what she said and (even) how she moved. She appeared to have been very ill at ease and nervous. The video is clearly targeted towards the Russian general population. ⁵⁵ Notably, there appeared to be a tracheostomy scar on her lower throat, indicating that there had been a fairly recent surgical procedure (and presumably done to assist her breathing).

From then on, both Sergei SKRIPAL and his daughter appear to have been totally ‘disappeared’. The UK mainstream media have either ignored their ‘disappearance’, or have made unsubstantiated claims that the father and daughter have simply moved to another country, under false identities. ⁵⁶ What is especially extraordinary is the total absence of interviews with, or articles, by either Sergei or Yulia. This could easily

⁵⁴ Statement from Dr. Christine Blanshard, england.nhs.uk; and 3-minute video, news.sky.com, 10th April 2018

⁵⁵ She speaks in Russian for part of the video, and her signed statement is written (by her) in Russian.

⁵⁶ ‘Poisoned Duo Flee – Targets of Salisbury Novichok poisoning flee Britain after two years in MI5 safe house’, by Richard Moriarty, *The Sun*, 6th June 2020

be arranged without compromising their safety, whatsoever – assuming that they are both in a fit condition, and also free, to do such things.

Beginning on the 25th March 2018 UK mainstream media began running the story that 3 young boys had been poisoned after eating bread given to them by Sergei SKRIPAL to feed ducks on a river in “Avon Park”.^{57 58}

That story was subsequently used by the US intelligence services as a means to persuade President Donald Trump to impose extensive, severe US punitive sanctions against Russia.

It was to be more than a year before the Director of Public Health (Wiltshire) and by Salisbury District Hospital, issued statements insisting that no children (and, indeed, no other people other than Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL and Nick BAILEY) had been considered to have been (or suspected of having been) exposed to a toxic nerve agent on the 4th March 2018.⁵⁹

2.3 Sunday 8th July 2018

On the 30th June 2018 two people in Amesbury were taken to hospital suffering from (it was believed at the time) drug overdoses – those two persons being Dawn STURGESS (a resident of Salisbury) at 10:15 hours and her partner Charlie ROWLEY (a resident of Amesbury) some 5 hours later at 15:30 hours. The symptoms presented were typically those of severe opioid poisoning. However, and operating purely (we are told) on “a hunch”, blood samples from those two individuals were sent to DSTL Porton Down.

DSTL Porton Down subsequently informed the UK Government that the blood samples from both individuals tested positive for the nerve agent Novichok – and of the exact same type as used in the 4th March poisonings of Sergei SKRIPAL, Yulia SKRIPAL, and DS Nick BAILEY, some 4 months previously. The Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command (London) conveyed that information to Parliament, and (hence) to the general public, on that same day.

On the 8th July 2018 Dawn STURGESS died without ever regaining consciousness.

On the 10th July 2018 Charlie ROWLEY regained consciousness, and began talking to the police. Charles ROWLEY is quoted as saying that Dawn STURGESS became ill within 15 minutes of spraying ‘perfume’ on her wrist from a bottle of Nina Ricci ‘Premier Jour’ perfume that he had unwittingly (and, it is assumed, in all innocence) given to her (in Amesbury) as a gift.

Charles ROWLEY would later say that he believed he had initially become contaminated whilst he was assembling the ‘perfume applicator’.

⁵⁷ ‘Three children were taken to hospital after Sergei Skripal gave them bread to feed ducks in the park where the Russian spy and his daughter were found poisoned’, Gareth Davies, Mail Online, 25th March 2018.

⁵⁸ ‘Children hospitalised after poisoned Russian spy “gave them bread to feed ducks”’, Jimmy Nsubuga, Metro, 25th March 2018.

⁵⁹ ‘No children or ducks harmed by novichok, say health officials’, Steven Morris and Caroline Bannock, The Guardian, 19th April 2019.

The symptoms exhibited by Charlie ROWLEY – and witnessed firsthand by his friend Sam HOBSON – were almost identical to that of DS Nick BAILEY (including the profuse sweating and hallucinating) in Salisbury, on the 4th March.⁶⁰ Sam HOBSON has described Charlie ROWLEY's symptoms in detail:

*“He [Charlie ROWLEY] started sweating. His T-shirt was soaking wet. He got up and started rocking against the wall. ... His eyes were wide open and red, his pupils were like pinpricks. He began gabbling incoherently and I could tell he was hallucinating. He was making weird noises and acting like a zombie ... [He] was dribbling, rocking and hallucinating”*⁶¹

However, and most notably, the description Charlie ROWLEY gave for the perfume – of it being an “*an oily substance, with very little odour*” – was an almost textbook description for Novichok-7.

Therefore, and most oddly, whilst he could be precise in describing the content of the ‘perfume’ bottle (of its “*odour*”, rather than “*smell*”) he was extremely vague as to when, and where, he had found it. And whilst both Charlie ROWLEY and Sam HOBSON both admitted that they had spent much of the previous day in Queen Elizabeth Gardens (QEG) in Salisbury (i.e. on the 29th June), Charlie ROWLEY was adamant that he did not find the packaged (cellophane wrapped) bottle of ‘perfume’ in the QEG (referred to as “*Lizzie Gardens*” by HOBSON). Instead, Charlie ROWLEY stated that he believed he might have found it, a few days previously, in rubbish bins elsewhere in Salisbury.^{62 63}

Notably, although Charlie ROWLEY dismissed the location as being QEG, the UK police used the incident to conduct an extensive (but presumably fruitless) search of that particular public park in Salisbury.

There is a rather disturbing codicil that needs to be added to this matter.

Some 3 years previously Charles ROWLEY had become involved in the procuring and distributing of ‘Class A’ drugs.⁶⁴ In November 2015 he was sent to jail for eight weeks after being caught (in Salisbury) with 11 packages of heroin. A year later, in 2016, his brother Matthew ROWLEY was found guilty of being a dealer in ‘Class A’ drugs (heroin, and crack cocaine).⁶⁵ However, the UK mainstream media have routinely referred to Charles ROWLEY only in terms of his having been a registered heroin addict. It was almost certainly that history that initially caused the emergency services (ambulance crew) to treat the poisoning of those two particular people as victims of an opioid drug overdose (e.g. Fentanyl).

⁶⁰ A year later, in August 2019, Sam Hobson pleaded guilty in Salisbury Magistrates Court to being in possession of Class A drugs. He was fined £100. Source: The ‘Fourteen Cases Heard At Salisbury Magistrate’s Court’, Salisbury Journal, 15th August 2019.

⁶¹ From: ‘Novichok victim Dawn Sturgess is captured on CCTV brushing past a young child to buy alcohol in an off licence – hours before she collapsed from exposure to deadly nerve agent’, Jake Wallis Simmons, Mail Online, 5th July 2018.

⁶² ITV News, 24th July 2018, YouTube download.

⁶³ In UK towns and cities rubbish and recycling bins are routinely emptied by local government refuse department and private companies usually at least once a week. This is a requirement mandated by health and environmental protection regulations. Therefore, for those wishing to keep to the State narrative, then this fact, together with ROWLEY claiming to have found it at around the end of June / beginning of July, would require that the ‘perfume’ was placed in a rubbish bin some 10 weeks after the events in Salisbury on the 4th March 2018. Which would rather beg the question: placed there by whom (and for what reason)?

⁶⁴ ‘Man caught with 11 wraps of heroin jailed’, Salisbury Journal, 6th Nov. 2015. The offence occurred in Exeter Street, Salisbury. Charles Rowley was also found guilty of stealing £1,700 from his brother, Matthew Rowley. Mr. Rowley was jailed for 8 weeks.

⁶⁵ ‘Drug dealer who tried to ditch £600-worth of heroin and crack cocaine spared jail’, Katy Griffin, Salisbury Journal, 15th April 2016

I am in no doubt that both Charlie ROWLEY and Sam HOBSON will have been very well known to officers within Wiltshire Constabulary. And more than that, I am inclined to believe that both of them will have been well known (by reputation, at the very least) to DS Nick BAILEY of Salisbury CID.

The horrific death of Dawn STURGESS provided the UK State with a means to describe (to the general public) the way in which a highly toxic nerve agent had been covertly administered to Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL some 4 months previously. We were therefore shown how a rather 'Heath Robinson' device had been used for that purpose – a re-engineered bottle of 'Nina Ricci *Premier Jour*' perfume.

That device consisted of a tiny glass bottle (phial) with a sealed plastic screw-top (35mm diameter x 55mm, 5.5mL capacity) containing the nerve agent in solution, a separate plastic screw top, and a plastic dispenser / applicator tube for attaching to the screw-top. All of those components had been contained within a cellophane-wrapped, small (20mm x 40mm x 80mm), 'Nina Ricci' cardboard presentation box.

The extraordinarily small size of the 'perfume' bottle (5.5mL total) and its equally small packaging strongly suggests that it was based upon a free-gift 'sampler' commonly used in marketing / promotional campaigns for cosmetic products.⁶⁶ Such 'sampler' sizes are usually to be seen in street promotions, mail drops (i.e. though people's letter boxes), or as 'goody bags' at high-end conferences and media events.

On the 4th July 2018 the UK Government announced that a nerve agent Novichik had poisoned Dawn STURGESS and Charlie ROWLEY (i.e. announced just 4 days after they had been taken ill). It was immediately afterward that the Wiltshire police began their very thorough and prolonged 'fingertip' search of Queen Elizabeth Gardens. The bushes and shrubs and lawn areas, the Avon River, the children's playground, and the public toilets were all subject to detailed forensic inspection. And, apparently, nothing of interest was ever found.

What is particularly astonishing is that that type of search was never done in either the Maltings area of Salisbury or in the area around Sergei SKRIPAL's house, immediately after the events of the 4th March 2018. At that time – and in that area – the activities of the authorities was limited only to the very public 'decontamination' of the area (i.e. the removal of street furniture, vehicles), to the closure and cordoning-off of commercial and public buildings (i.e. the Zizzi and the Bishops Mill restaurants, the Sainsbury's Car Park), the gathering of details of potential eyewitnesses, and the confiscation of CCTV recordings.

3 ANALYSIS

Much of the following analysis is predicated upon the content of the Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV video that was eventually released by the MPS Counter Terrorism Command in late 2018.

First and foremost – and most importantly – there is this analysis of the Fisherton Street CCTV videos / pictures.

⁶⁶ In contrast the usual sizes, for that retail, for that Nina Ricci product, are 30mL, 50mL, or 100mL.

As being visitors to Salisbury, the only plausible destination intended by PETROV and BOSHIROV, when walking westward along Bridge Street / Fisherton Street, would have been Salisbury Railway Station.

Immediately prior to that appearance of PETROV and BOSHIROV, on that Bridge Street / Fisherton Street video, they could have only come from one of two possible directions – from The Maltings to the North, or from Salisbury High Street to the South. However, the CCTV sequence, provided by MPS-CTC, begins too late for that to be determined. The full video sequence would have enabled the actual route (out of those two possibilities) taken by PETROV and BOSHIROV to have been properly confirmed.

Both areas (The Maltings to the North, and Salisbury High Street to the South) have numerous CCTV installations (local authority, commercial, private) that would have enabled an accurate identification of the route followed by PETROV and BOSHIROV to be made. Indeed (and most absurdly) for between 11:58 hours and 13:45 hours (time corrected, see below), we are expected to believe either: (1) that no CCTV video surveillance whatsoever was ever obtained of the activities / movements of PETROV and BOSHIROV; or (2) that some such video material was obtained, but had to be withheld from the public.

We can be reasonably sure that if the Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV video had shown PETROV and BOSHIROV not crossing Bridge Street from The Maltings, then the UK State would have released the full (un-redacted) version to the public. Not least, it would have supported the UK State's attempts to develop a new narrative (*circa* post July 2018) that PETROV and BOSHIROV had returned from the SKRIPAL house via Churchfields Road, Mill Road, Queen Elizabeth Gardens, and Salisbury High Street.

The obvious conclusion is, therefore, that PETROV and BOSHIROV had, indeed, walked from The Maltings to Bridge Street – on their way back to Salisbury Railway Station.

The timeline narrative provided by the MPS-CTC is therefore determined to be wrong – that exactly 40 minutes has been subtracted from the true timing (of events). It is surmised that this was to make it appear that PETROV and BOSHIROV were in that area much earlier than they actually were. The narrative, constructed by the MPS-CTC, had to be that they were therefore not there at the same time that Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were in The Maltings (i.e. within a mere 200 meters, or less, to PETROV and BOSHIROV). Most certainly, any suggestion that PETROV and BOSHIROV arrived in The Maltings at exactly the same time (i.e. at 13:40 hours) as Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL had to be 'debunked'.

This particular CCTV video sequence was not made public (by the UK Government) until November 2018 – i.e. some 8 months after the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL. Notably the video, and the video 'grabs', have been cropped in such a way as to remove the digitally embedded date / time stamps as well as being very truncated in duration in a way that removes vitally important information.

A close examination of the Bridge Street / Fisherton Street CCTV video indicates that PETROV and BOSHIROV may have been under 'covert' street surveillance. The following explains that observation.

As PETROV and BOSHIROV walk onto The Bridge Street / Avon Bridge they pass behind a man standing on the edge of the road, next to some yellow scaffolding, and initially facing away from them. The man appears to be roughly the same age and physical build as PETROV and BOSHIROV. He appears to be

wearing dark clothing that includes a dark parka with a light fur-lined hood, a green and yellow woolen 'bobble hat', a grey scarf, and light / white 'trainers'. That person will be referred to as 'Bobble Hat'.

After PETROV and BOSHIROV have walked a little distance past 'Bobble Hat', he turns and begins to look in their direction (at them?). A few seconds later – whilst PETROV was taking a picture of The Avon and The Riverside Walk area – BOSHIROV turned around and looked directly back at the man.

As PETROV and BOSHIROV continued their walk across the bridge, BOSHROV made some sort of remark to PETROV, and gestured with his hand in a direction behind him (in the direction of the man). PETROV appears to have responded with a laugh. 'Bobble Hat' – whilst continuing to look in the direction of PETROV and BOSHIROV – made a signal with his right hand to someone nearby (not visible in the video). Immediately afterward 'Bobble Hat' then began slowly walking in the direction of either: (1) across The Avon Bridge; or (2) down The Riverside Walk (again, the truncation of the video is a problem, here).

PETROV and BOSHIROV continued their walk towards Salisbury Railway Station.

The Dauwalders coins/stamps/postcard shop is just past The Avon Bridge, on Fisherton Street, on the way to Salisbury Railway Station (now just a 3 minute walk away). The shop's CCTV recorded PETROV and BOSHIROV walking past the shop, pausing briefly to look in the shop window, before resuming the walk to the station. The CCTV recorded the time as 13:48 – which is consistent with their arrival at the station.⁶⁷

Notably, whilst PETROV and BOSHIROV were looking in the shop window, BOSHIROV turned (again) to look down the street, toward approximately where 'Bobble Hat' had been standing.

This, then, provides extraordinary, compelling evidence that PETROV and BOSHIROV were under close surveillance within central Salisbury on (at least) the Sunday – and that, most notably, they actually knew they were being watched but seemed to have no concerns, whatsoever.

So, what then of the supposed activities of Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, post 13:40 hours?

Most notably, no CCTV video / video grabs have ever been provided to the public (by the UK Government) of either The Maltings or the Castle Street areas of central Salisbury, for the 4th March 2018. Of particular interest (of course) would have be the time period 13:40 hours to 13:50 hrs.

The narrative, eventually expounded by the UK State 'Authorities', was that "*some time*" after parking at the Sainsbury's car park, Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL walked to the Bishop's Mill restaurant where they both had drinks (i.e. between approximately 13:50 hours and 14:20 hours), before walking to the Rizzi restaurant on Castle Street for a meal (i.e. between approximately 14:30 hours and 15:35 hours).

This was presumably why the UK mainstream media were so very keen to find CCTV video footage of them walking back through The Market Walk, in a direction that would have taken them to the bench

⁶⁷ Note that some error-band (of up to a few minutes) must be applied to the CCTV time stamps. At this time (circa 2018) such CCTV were not generally connected to The Internet, such that the date and time stamps could be automatically set / corrected. Therefore such information would be set (or reset) by the operating manager, via the hard drive options menu – and often just by reference to the operator's wrist watch.

(opposite the Superdrug Store) where they both supposedly collapsed from an assassins' poison. The UK mainstream media clearly believed this was necessary in order to be in full lockstep with that contrived 'Authoritative' narrative – even to the extent of making obviously stupid journalistic decisions.

A household CCTV shows the BMW 320 of Sergei SKRIPAL to have been driven along India Avenue, toward Devizes Road at 14:55 hours (see previous section). For reasons given in the Conclusions section that video is considered genuine, accurate, and very important.

The very brief CCTV sequences obtained by UK mainstream media at *circa* 16:00 hours (from within The Market Walk passageway that connects Castle Street and The Maltings) caused considerable public confusion – including potential confusion / misdirection to witnesses within Salisbury itself). However, the much-touted claims that those two particular CCTV videos showed Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL walking from the Zizzi in Castle Street, to the Bishop's Mill The Maltings can be discounted – they obviously do not show the Russian father and daughter walking through that passageway, at those times.⁶⁸

The CCTV from Jenny's Restaurant is incorrectly set to DST (GMT + 1 hour). Therefore, with adjustment, it shows the ambulance driving through Market Walk at 16.15 hours GMT (17:15 hours DST), and a man and woman (with her pink handbag) walking through the passageway over an hour earlier, at 15:07 hours GMT (16:07 hours DST). The CCTV from SnapFitness.24.7 shows a balding man and a blonde haired woman (the man wearing a dark jacket and trousers, and the woman wearing a knee-length black coat and light slacks and carrying what appears to be a red leather Bag bag), holding hands, and walking through the passageway at 15:47 hours. Those two people will be referred to as the 'Red Bag Couple'.

Despite the very considerable media speculation as to their identity (including many false claims by the media that they were Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL), the 'Red Bag Couple' never came forward to reveal their true identity. The UK police (Wiltshire Constabulary and MPS-CTP) neither publically identified them as being the SKRIPAL's, nor did they publically rule it out. There were no appeals by the police directed specifically to those two persons to make (in confidence) contact with the 'authorities' – as potential witnesses, or to exclude themselves as possible associates of any suspects (or as the SKRIPALS).

The problem here is that the original, 'on the day', observations made by the public (and by restaurant staff / managers) was that the sequence of events was the opposite of that promulgated by The State: that the SKRIPAL's had, in fact, first gone to the Zizzi restaurant for a meal, and then to the Bishop's Mill for drinks.

A very important observation needs to be included in this analysis.

The observation is that, in the days and weeks following the 4th March, the police did not undertake any serious or proper search for material evidence (see previous section). This indicates one of two possibilities: (1) that the UK 'authorities' knew that such a search was unnecessary (they knew everything they needed to know); or (2) that such a search might be detrimental to the required narrative.

⁶⁸ In regard to the elderly (slim, not portly) Man and similarly aged blond woman (with the red bag) walking past the fitness centre at 15:47 hours, or the elderly (slim, not portly) Man and the much shorter woman walking past the café at 16:07 hours (after Sergei and Yulia Skripal were found collapsed on the park bench) Clearly, neither of the couples are Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL. In the latter case, a woman passing the couple with a dog on a lead has also been mistakenly identified as Julia SKRIPAL.

It was only after the events in Amesbury in early July 2018 that we were to see the sought of police search (of a crime scene) that we might expect for such serious matters (and extreme danger to the public).

The discovery of the fake Nina Ricci 'perfume' bottle / dispenser in Amesbury, supposedly containing a toxic nerve agent that had killed Dawn STURGESS, was presented by the UK 'Authorities' as being exactly the same *modus operandi* as that used in Salisbury to poison the SKRIPALs. But how could that be known, if no proper searches had been made in Salisbury? Such a strong assertion would only makes sense (and be reliable) if the UK 'Authorities' had other information (also not made available to the public) to back up that assertion. Why such secrecy?

This raises the question of the strange choice of the delivery device (the Nina Ricci 'perfume bottle').

Whilst the 'perfume' bottle appears to have come from the Nina Ricci product line, the bottle top and dispenser appears to have come from a JOX spray bottle of nasal / larynx anti-pathogen medicine made in the Czech Republic (see attached pictures). Getting the parts, and assembling the 'perfume' applicator will therefore have been a relatively simple task.

However this is obviously not true for the bottle contents, which will have been a difficult and potentially a very hazardous procedure – requiring the facilities to be found in an establishment equipped and experiences in handling highly toxic chemical agents.

The argument that all of this artifice was necessary to get the device through UK customs begs the question – why not, instead, choose a local source (UK) for the device (the bottle, packaging, and the JOX applicator), a locally sourced chemical toxin (i.e. Fentanyl and / or organophosphate), and delivery to the intended victim(s) by means of a local proxy (including, by ordinary postage through the UK Mail)?⁶⁹

Note: the important relevance regarding the fact that a key part of that nerve agent 'applicator' (the modified Nina Ricci 'perfume' bottle) originated from the Czech Republic will be addressed later.

Central to the UK State narrative has been the assertion that a military-grade nerve agent (Novichok) was used in an attempt to kill Sergei SKRIPAL – an action which resulted in the near-death of both Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, the near-death of DS Nick BAILEY, the near death of Charlie ROWLEY, and the actual death of Dawn STURGESS. That narrative had very quickly evolved from that of the chemical toxin responsible for those casualties as being a 'Class-A' opioid drug (most probably Fentanyl), to it being a deadly nerve agent Novichok brought into the UK and used by two Russian GRU operatives.

The UK State narrative is made superficially credible by the apparent similarities in the symptoms of Fentanyl and Novichok poisoning. However, this is, indeed, only superficial. It belies the actual, fundamentally different way in which those two very different toxins actually operate: opioids, such as Fentanyl, attack the central nervous system (the brain, brain stem, and spinal cord), whilst weapons-grade nerve agents such as Novichok, attack the peripheral nervous system.

⁶⁹ As, I recall, which was being regularly done by such businesses at that time. Mailed products included free samples of hair shampoo, hand gel, soap, deodorant – and perfume.

This important difference means, for example, that an opioid will cause adverse mental states such as hallucinations, headaches, delirium, and excessively perverse behaviour before causing the core bodily functions (respiratory and heart function) to falter and to shut down – leading to coma and death. However, a nerve agent (such as Novichok) or an organophosphate (such as a pesticide) will primarily effect the connections between the nerve endings and the muscle cells. This causes a progressive paralysis of the lungs, diaphragm and heart – leading (also) to the onset of coma and death.

The difference in ‘markers’ is therefore this: that whilst for an opioid the preliminary indications (of poisoning) will most likely be hallucinations and behavioural anomalies (i.e. irrational anger, paranoia, fear, confusion, aggressiveness, *et al*), such ‘markers’ will be absent for a nerve agent. In that regard it could be said that the true horror of nerve agent (Novichuk) poisoning is that the victim is fully conscious and aware of their predicament – that their lungs and heart are being shut down, and that there is nothing they can do about it. Unconsciousness, coma and death will quickly follow. The opposite is true for opioid poisoning – that loss of rational reasoning and hallucinatory behaviour precedes loss of consciousness, coma, and death (as a result of eventual lung and heart failure).

And the same observations and arguments can be extended to other particular opioid ‘markers’ such as excessive sweating, headaches and miosis (‘pinprick’ pupils).⁷⁰

This, then, makes the article by Dr. Christine BLANSHARD, published on the 10th April 2021, especially interesting. I believe that in her article she was accurately reporting the symptoms exhibited by Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, and by Nick BAILEY as: “*sickness, hallucinations and confusion*” – which will have been the reason that those three people were initially treated for extreme opioid poisoning. However in the article she attributes those symptoms to a “*nerve agent*” (for which she provides a broadly correct description). Her description of the treatment provided by SDH to those three people is also broadly consistent with treatment for nerve agent poisoning. However the symptoms are not simply those of nerve agent poisoning. They are more representative of a combination of both – nerve agent plus opioid.

The OPCW tests, in regard to the Amesbury poisonings, found that the ‘perfume bottle’ contents to have been an almost pure (i.e. 97 – 98 per cent) “*toxic chemical*” – and therefore (by implication) was the same result also found for the ‘environmental’ samples obtained at Salisbury 4 months earlier.

The results of the ‘environmental’ analysis of forensic evidence provided by the police were therefore entirely separate (and different) from the results of the ‘biomedical’ analysis samples of evidence taken by medical staff from the actual poisoning victims (such as tissue and blood samples). In the former case the findings were of an almost pure “*toxic chemical*”, and in the latter case the findings were of a “*toxic chemical compound*”. This is highly significant.

The OPCW attempted to insinuate that the difference was due to “*contaminants*”, but without describing what those “*contaminants*” were, or how they got there. The specific use of the expression “*toxic chemical compound*” strongly suggests the presence of at least two, significant poisoning agents having been found.

⁷⁰ One particular ‘marker’, miosis (pin-sized pupils), appears to be prominent in both opioid and nerve agent poisoning. It is therefore considered unsuitable for this form of differentiating analysis.

So, what did we observe in Salisbury, in 2018?

The following is a summary of witness observations for the four individuals that were apparently affected by opioid poisoning (according to the opioid / Fentanyl 'markers'), in Salisbury and Amesbury in 2018: Sergei SKRIPAL – hallucinations; Yulia SKRIPAL – (very) early loss of consciousness; Nick BAILEY – hallucinations, excessive sweating, miosis (pinprick pupils); Charlie ROWLEY – loss of balance, dribbling, miosis, hallucinations, perverse / irrational behaviour (anger, paranoia, aggressiveness); and Dawn STURGESS – extreme headache, (very) early loss of consciousness.

Despite the peculiar menagerie of symptoms exhibited, the judgment made by the UK medical authorities was (it would seem) that the poison was very simple in composition – firstly assuming that it was just (and only) an opioid; but then, subsequently, that it was only a particular form of highly toxic nerve agent.⁷¹

It would appear that a more complicated composition (such as a combination of opioid and a nerve agent) was never considered – or if it was, then this was not to be communicated to the general public. This matter will be addressed in detail, within the following (Conclusions) section of the report.

Now we come on to the newspaper reports of the 'children feeding ducks' story, promulgated by UK mainstream media in the period 25th to 28th March 2018. This research has determined that the 'duck feeding' story relates to a sighting of the SKRIPALs in the vicinity of The Avon Playground area, in The Malting, sometime that Sunday afternoon.

Notably, at that time (early 2018) that particular area of central Salisbury was very well equipped with Council-controlled, high-definition, panoramic CCTV – including: one camera high on the Sainsbury's building; one camera on a street light on the edge of the Tesco Express staff car park; and one camera on western exit of The Market Walk. All of those 3 cameras overlooked the Avon Playground (i.e. the bank of the small tributary of the Avon River), The Maltings shopping area, and the bench where the SKRIPAL's had collapsed on the 4th March 2018. All of those cameras were working and were switched on.

In addition there were numerous commercial CCTV installations throughout the area. This included (no less than) 16 CCTV cameras inside The Bishops Mill restaurant, a CCTV camera covering the entrance to The Zizzi restaurant, and 2 cameras installed within the Superdrug pharmacy that overlooked the bench and surrounding area that had been the focus of the terrible events on the 4th March 2018.

Despite all of this CCTV coverage, the UK police and investigatory authorities have not released any CCTV recordings from that area, whatsoever. The only CCTV recordings that the public was allowed to see were from two establishments within Market Walk – and this was only because some elements of the

⁷¹ This analysis of the symptomatic 'markers' can be assisted by means of a 'combinatorial citation check' using any reputable Internet search engine. Whilst this confirms the basic premise of the above analysis, it also produces some interesting insights into the UK State's and mainstream media's 'authoritarian' approach to such matters. For example, a check for correlations between Fentanyl and symptoms of hallucination has shown a disparity of 61 million (Fentanyl) versus 11,400 (Novichok). However, even in that extraordinary difference, the examples in the latter (Novichok) number are predominantly due to references to reports of the poisoning in Salisbury in 2018. In other words (for example) the State and mainstream media narrative insistence that Novichok was the toxin used in Salisbury and Amesbury creates a false (highly inflated) correlation between Novichok and (in this case) symptoms of hallucinating.

mainstream media were able to take direct recordings (using mobile devices) off of the CCTV recording equipment within those shops (whilst also interviewing staff members). Therefore, to a very limited extent, those actions subverted efforts by the police to “seize” all CCTV recordings from that area, at that time.⁷²

This was happening at the same time that the police were making appeals to the local people of Salisbury (and to visitors to Salisbury, over the weekend in question) to contact them if they believed they had important eyewitness information regarding the events, at that time. The police wanted to know who they were, and what they knew.

Just eight weeks after the Salisbury poisonings it was reported that, on the orders of the Czech Prime Minister Andriy BABIS, the Director of the Czech Military Research Institution (VVU) Bohuslav SAFAR was to be sacked. The reason given for that decision being that Bohuslav SAFAR had made it known to the Czech President Milos ZEMAN that the VVU had, since 2016, been manufacturing and experimenting with the nerve agent Novichok – with that information subsequently being made public.^{73 74 75}

The Czech Government insisted that the nerve agent in question had been A-230 – that it was a precursor to A-234 that (the Czech Government informed us) had been used in Salisbury.⁷⁶ Actually the UK Government had only ever said (in an extremely weasel-word manner) that the Salisbury nerve agent was “*being from a family of substances known as Novichok*” (which, indeed, could include a precursor to Novichok such as A-230) – and the OPCW would only publically describe the agent as a “*toxic chemical*”.

However A-234 is distinctly different to the Novichok variants (with A-234 being a unitary agent, whilst Novichok-5 being a binary analog of A-232, and Novichok-7 being a binary analog of A-234).

Secondly, The Czech Government, in its claims that “*some grammes, only*” of the nerve agent A-230 (or something like it) had ever been produced at the VVU – implying that the victims at Salisbury would need to have been exposed to many grammes of that particular nerve agent to have been so seriously affected. This is nonsense – just 1 gramme of any of the Novichok variants / analogs (including A-230 and A-234) are potentially sufficient to provide a lethal dose for many hundreds of human adults.⁷⁷

Why would the VVU be experimenting with A-230 and not a later variant (such as A-234, or Novichok) – given that the latter would make much more sense from a ‘defence research’ point-of-view? Why were the OCPW not called in, at that time (May, 2018), to carry out an inspection (and to report on) the VVU?

⁷² “*We had seized over 11,000 hours of CCTV that was a massive task*” (attributed the MPS Assistant Commissioner Dean Haydon), source: ‘How accurate is The Salisbury Poisoning? The true story behind the nerve agent attack’, by Eleanor Bley Griffiths, Radio Times, 12th June 2020.

⁷³ ‘Novichok-type nerve agent “produced in Czech Republic last year”, by Chris Harris, EuroNews.com, 3rd May 2018

⁷⁴ ‘Czech Military Research Institute director fired over Novichok scandal’, by Dilyana Gayrandzhieva, Dilyana.bg, 15th May 2018

⁷⁵ ‘Military Research Institute head sacked for multiple reasons’, by Katerina Svobodova, PragueMonitor.com, 17th May 2018

⁷⁶ ‘Czech Foreign Ministry says nerve gas tested in Brno was different from that used in UK attack’, by Daniela Lazarova, English.radio.cz, 5th May 2018

⁷⁷ The LD50 figure for Novichok is given as 0.22mcg/Kg. Source: ‘Novichok agents: a historical, current, and toxicological perspective’, Chai, Haynes, Erikson and Boyer, Toxicol Commun, 2018: 2(1): 45-48

Notably, some six months later, the propaganda and disinformation campaign, around past events in the Czech Republic, began to be ratcheted up. In October 2018 news reports emanating from Ukraine (and citing RFE / RL as the source) were claiming that, in Prague in 2012, two individuals with the names Alexander PETROV and Ruslan BOSHIROV had been spying on Sergei SKRIPAL.⁷⁸

In Mark URBAN's biography of Sergei SKRIPAL there is this rather strange passage: "*People in the know have emphatically denied that he [Sergei SKRIPAL] was helping the SBU [the Ukrainian secret police].*"⁷⁹ This is quite obviously an attempt, by the author, to provoke a "*well he would say that, wouldn't he!*" In other words, it seems to be very clear that the intention is to make the reader think that Sergei SKRIPAL was working with the SBU – and was therefore a prime target (for assassination) by the Russian State.

My experience has been, in some twenty years of researching such matters, is that such carefully contrived comments are often used to conceal the very opposite of the actual situation – in this case, that it was the Ukrainian SBU who saw Sergei SKRIPAL as an enemy who they would want to see being eliminated. The context for this is given in the preamble of this report – Sergei SKRIPAL's input to the UK Intelligence Service (MI6) expressing his argued support for Russian intervention to help the people of the Donbas, and for the Russian annexation of Crimea.

In April 2021 (three years after Salisbury) it was reported that the Czech BIS were claiming that in 2014 two people using the aliases Alexander PETROV and Ruslan BOSHIROV were involved in sabotage against a major weapons storage areas in the Czech town of Vrbetice. Other reports (at that time) linked those weapons stores to the clandestine shipment of armaments (via proxy private arms dealers) from the Czech Republic to terrorist groups in Syria (e.g. ISIS, Al Nusra Front), and to the Kyiv-controlled Ukrainian military forces, then slaughtering / terrorizing the ethnic Russian people in the Donbas.⁸⁰

In September 2022 the German and Czech intelligence services (including the BND and the BIS) were (apparently) the sources for the extraordinary claims that Russia had been using German and Czech companies as sources for chemical raw materials in the manufacture of Novichok.⁸¹ On that basis, it is therefore assumed that the German and Czech States also had the capabilities to manufacture Novichok.

5 ADDENDUM

Although this addendum is very brief, it is seen as being of very considerable importance.

This addendum presents evidence that the CIA had prior knowledge of the covert operation that culminated in the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL in the city of Salisbury in England, on the 4th March 2018 – and that, furthermore, the CIA may have had an active part in that horrific incident.

⁷⁸ 'RFE/RL : Russian Novichok suspects shadowed Skripal in Prague, report says', kyivpost.com, 10th October 2018

⁷⁹ 'The Skripal Files – Putin, Poison and The New Spy War', by Mark Urban, Pan Books, 2019, page 266

⁸⁰ [untitled], bne IntelliNews, intellinews.com, 26th April 2021

⁸¹ 'The Russians wanted to get chemicals from the Czech Republic also suitable for the production of novichok. It was thwarted by BIS', [translation], Aktuálně.cz, 2nd September 2022

This assessment is the inevitable conclusion drawn from an inspection of official US Government documents (top-level CIA email transcripts) posted at that time (i.e. from the beginning of March 2018).

Scans of those documents are included at the end of this report.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions to this report will be in the form of a narrative substantially different to that promulgated by the UK State 'Authorities', but which (it is argued) offers a better fit to all the available evidence. Obviously, by their very nature, those conclusions will include suppositions and conjecture – but (again, it is also argued) substantially less so, than is required by the State narrative.

There is, actually, a reasonable and rationale explanation for the activities of PETROV and BOSHIROV in Salisbury, on both Saturday the 3rd March, and Sunday the 4th March 2018. This is as follows:

In regard to their activities on the Saturday, I would also agree that it was (in part) a 'reconnaissance' – in the sense that PETROV and BOSHIROV wanted to sort out the way for them getting from their hotel in East London (Bow), to Salisbury, using the UK rail system. The purpose of that exercise was in preparation for a meeting with Sergei SKRIPAL, planned for the next day (i.e. Sunday, the 4th March).

However, whilst they had planned to spend most of the Saturday sightseeing, the weather was such that they had to abandon their plans to visit Stonehenge and Old Sarum. Therefore, instead, they decided to walk to, and to explore, the nearby Salisbury Cathedral and the immediate surrounding area.

In this regard, their subsequent story (*circa* late 2018, on Russian TV) that it was on the Sunday (not Saturday) that they had spent their trip touring Salisbury Cathedral was a necessary attempt to conceal the fact that they had, in fact, gone to the house of Sergei SKRIPAL on that day (i.e. on the Sunday).

There are some interesting details, mentioned by PETROV and BOSHIROV in that TV interview – notably that they spent some time in a coffee shop, within a park, before heading back to the railway station. I conclude that, most likely, this would have been The Salisbury Orangery, by The River Walk. This was the same area that PETROV took a photo of, from Bridge Street / Fisherton Street, the next day.

So, what then of the events of Sunday, the 4th March 2018?

PETROV and BOSHIROV did, indeed, arrive at the house of Sergei SKRIPAL, a few minutes after 12:00 hours on the 4th March 2018. It was a pre-arranged meeting. Therefore they were expected, and after providing acceptable identification and of their intentions, they were let into the house. PETROV and BOSHIROV remained there for approximately one and a half hours (i.e. until approximately 13:30 hours) – during which time they presumably were in conversation with both Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL.

It is therefore surmised that, at approximately 13:30 hours, Sergei SKRIPAL drove PETROV and BOSHIROV into Salisbury City Centre in his maroon BMW 320D. His car was therefore captured on the CCTV of The Devizes Inn, being driven (presumably by him) down the A360 at 13:32 hours.

They arrived in the vicinity of Sainsbury's Car Part at approximately 13:36 hours. It is reasonable to assume that shortly afterward the SKRIPALs, and PETROV and BOSHIROV, parted company – with the former parking on the upper level of Sainsbury's Car Park (at approximately 13:40 hours), and the latter making their way to Salisbury Railway Station via The Maltings, and Bridge Street / Fisherton Street.

The most plausible route for PETROV and BOSHIROV to have taken would have been as follows: along The Riverside Walk through The Maltings; through the covered alleyway and down the footpath past The Bishop's Mill; over the small footbridge over the Avon River; a right turn on to Bridge Street; and then towards Fisherton Street and on to the Salisbury Railway Station.⁸²

It hasn't been possible to determine what Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were actually doing on the 4th March 2018, between 13:40 and 14:55 hours – other than that they had spent at least some of that time back at 47 Christie Miller Road. The fact that the UK police have refused to release CCTV recordings for that period would indicate that some of those activities do not support the UK State narrative (that, for example, that the SKRIPALs were at the Zizzi restaurant between 13:50 and 14:20 hours).

It must have been at some time prior to 14:50 hours that Sergei and Yulia drove back to the house in Christie Miller Road. At 14.50 hours they drove back (again) to Salisbury City Centre (and past the private house CCTV overlooking India Drive), arriving back in Salisbury City Centre at around 15.00 hours.⁸³

It is difficult to estimate when Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL arrived at The Bishops Mill (other than it must have been no earlier than approximately 15.05 hours.⁸⁴ They ordered two glasses of wine, but eventually left before finishing their drinks. Before leaving, Sergei SKRIPAL visited the upstairs Men's toilet, but upon return appeared (to another customer) to be somewhat drunk.

Therefore, by my reckoning, Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL spent something less than 40 minutes at The Bishops Mill – almost half the time given in the 'official' UK Government narrative.⁸⁵

The decision by the 'Red Bag Couple' to (reportedly) demand their bill at the Zizzi whilst still eating strongly indicates that they were anticipating having to leave the restaurant quickly – to have to dash to some other nearby place. The implication is that the 'Red Bag Couple' were connected to the surveillance effort in Salisbury, on that day, and of having a very particular role to play in that operation.

Therefore Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL left The Bishops Mill just before 15:45 hours, presumably to return to their car. They only got halfway – collapsing on the park bench opposite the Superdrug store.

⁸² Or alternatively, past Asman's Wine and Coffee House; past The Côte Brasserie restaurant; through St. Thomas Square, and a right turn onto Bridge Street

⁸³ Sergei Skripal's maroon coloured BMW was caught on the CCTV at 75 Macklin Road, at 14.55 hours, at the junction of India Avenue and Devizes Road, heading back towards Salisbury City Centre. That CCTV video has been dismissed by MPS / CTC as having an incorrect time stamp.

⁸⁴ Given the approximately 15 minutes needed to complete their drive to Salisbury City Centre, to park the car, and to walk to The Bishops Mill.

⁸⁵ That 'official' narrative that they were in The Bishops Mill from between 14:20 hours and 15:35 hours – a total of 75 minutes.

I also conclude that the 'Red Bag Couple' seen walking through The Market Walk, toward The Maltings, at 15:47 hours, were the same couple who had behaved in such a theatrically obnoxious way in the Rizzi restaurant just before that appearance in The Market Walk – in particular, the man's offensive berating (swearing at) the staff in loud 'Russian', and the two of them hurriedly leaving the restaurant after prematurely completing their meal (to the relief of staff and other diners, alike).

It is noted that the 'Red Bag Couple' were walking quite briskly (evidently in a hurry). Their demeanour was very much that of husband and wife – holding hands, walking in step, close together.⁸⁶ They walked down the passageway on the far side from the shops (as far as possible from the CCTV cameras), and as they passed SnapFitness.24.7 they looked directly at that establishment's entry CCTV.

There is no legitimate reason why the police could not have released the Maltings CCTV records. They could (for example) have used the same selective blurring technique that they used for the Fisherton Street and the Wilton Street (Shell Garage) CCTV recordings that were released to the public in late 2018. This would provide entirely adequate protection to members of the public, including potential eyewitnesses. Indeed, it would have aided a proper search for evidence, and a correct 'narrative'.

Such has been the hubris of the State agencies that they later felt confident enough to have actually bragged about of their ability to have "seized" some 11,000 hours of CCTV recordings.⁸⁷ This is seen as extraordinarily revealing example of *par praxis* – a spoken or written phrase that unwittingly reveals the true beliefs, motivations, beliefs and intentions of an individual or an organization, through unguarded comment. In this case, the beliefs, motivations, and intentions are seen to have been those of the UK State to prevent public knowledge of extreme State malfeasance.

In this regard, my conclusion is that the UK State was deliberately withholding information from the public, whilst attempting to identify (through police appeals) potential eyewitnesses. On the basis of such behaviour I therefore assume that the police had been instructed to find any and all members of the public who may have unwittingly (and unknowingly) seen a State-initiated surveillance operation in progress.

Given the observations made by Ross CASSIDY the previous day (at Heathrow) it is highly likely that Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were under surveillance for the whole of that afternoon – including observations of their movements around The Maltings area of central Salisbury, and of whom they were with (if anybody) – as well as their journeys to and from Sergei's house.

The problem for the Russian Government has always been (and still is) that for obvious political reasons it would never be able to admit having been so easily duped (by UK State 'security' operatives). Instead of which, it has had to stick to the preposterously sounding story that the two Russians (irrespective of whether they were GRU operatives, or merely 'chancers' looking for a news story from the SKRIPALS)

⁸⁶ This is very different for an adult father and daughter. In that case it is more usual for the daughter to 'take his arm'. Holding hands is normally reserved for a father with a daughter in her childhood.

⁸⁷ "We had seized over 11,000 hours of CCTV that was a massive task" (attributed the MPS Assistant Commissioner Dean Haydon), source: 'How accurate is The Salisbury Poisoning? The true story behind the nerve agent attack', by Eleanor Bley Griffiths, Radio Times, 12th June 2020.

were merely 'tourists'. The Russian Government could do little more than that of merely attempting to highlight the inconsistencies, omissions and incongruities within the official UK State narrative.⁸⁸

This, now, brings us on to matters concerning the events at the end of June and beginning of July 2018 in Amesbury – the poisoning and death of Dawn STURGESS and the poisoning of Charlie ROWLEY.

In this case the sequence of events is considered to have been as follows.

On the morning of the 1st July 2018 Dawn STURGESS was taken ill, in the flat of her boyfriend Charlie ROWLEY. An ambulance was called, and she was rushed to hospital. Later that same day ROWLEY also began to feel very unwell, and he was also taken by ambulance to hospital.

Given the symptoms displayed by both Dawn STURGESS and Charlie ROWLEY they were initially treated (by both the ambulance crew and hospital staff) for severe opiate poisoning. Dawn STURGESS was to die seven days later, on the 8th July 2018. Charlie ROWLEY survived.

It was (supposedly, according to the police) not until a week after those events that the police found a suspect Nina Ricci bottle of 'perfume' on the kitchen work-surface in ROWLEY's house. Charlie ROWLEY was extensively interviewed by the police as to (in particular) the source of the bottle of 'perfume'.

I suspect that he was subjected to considerable pressure, during those interviews, into considering the possibility that he had, in fact, found that Nina Ricci package in Salisbury – and that he had somehow got it mixed up with his other 'findings' that were littering his house. Given the considerable investment that had been made by the State, in the State 'narrative', this would certainly be what the police would want to hear.

It is important in regard to the above to be aware (at least) of the toxicology of poisoning by military nerve agents (such as Novichok) and by organophosphates (such as found in the pesticide industry).^{89 90 91 92 93}

In regard to the symptoms exhibited by the victims, and the comments made by the OPCW, I would conclude that two different "chemical agents" were present during the events in Salisbury and Amesbury: (1) the almost pure samples of a toxic chemical (nerve agent) collected by the police from the 'environment'; and (2) other toxic samples (not defined, but likely to include an opioid such as Fentanyl, together with an organophosphate-like substance) collected by the medical workers from the victims.

⁸⁸ It is interesting to note that whilst the UK mainstream media will (occasionally) speculate on other possible scenarios concerning the SKRIPALS / Salisbury incident, they will never include, within their list of those possible scenarios, the most credible alternative (i.e. the one given above).

⁸⁹ 'Briefing note for Emergency Departments – management of suspected Novichok poisonings (July 2018), Public Health England

⁹⁰ 'Nerve Agent and Organophosphate Pesticide Poisoning', Center for Disease Control and Prevention (USA), 4th April 2018

⁹¹ 'Clinical features of organophosphate poisoning – a review of different classification systems and approaches', John Victor Peter, Thomas Isiah Sudarson, John L Moran, National Library of Medicine, National Center for Biotechnology Information, Indian J Crit Care Med., 2014 Nov, 18(11); 735-745

⁹² 'Organophosphate : A Common But Deadly Pesticide', Kas Than, National Geographic, 18th July 2013

⁹³ 'Organophosphate Toxicity', Erika L Robb, Man B Baker, NCBI Bookshelf, National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health, 1st May 2022

So, what to (finally) conclude? On the basis of the substantive evidence discovered in the course of this research, I have therefore drawn the following conclusions:

(1) In 2018 Sergei SKRIPAL was under close surveillance by the UK Security Agencies – for (the UK State’s) extreme concern that he was thinking of returning to Russia.

(2) Two Russian citizens, Alexander PETROV and Ruslan BOSHIROV, met with Sergei SKRIPAL for an approximately 1 hour 20 minute meeting on the 4th March 2018. That meeting took place at Sergei SKRIPAL’s house.

(3) At the end of the meeting at *circa* 13:30 hours, Sergei SKRIPAL drove PETROV and BOSHIROV back into central Salisbury, close to the Maltings, for the short walk back to the Salisbury Railway Station – before driving back to his house at 47 Christie Miller Road. At around 15:00 hours Sergei SKRIPAL (together with his daughter) drove back into Salisbury..

(4) Throughout their visit to Salisbury, on that day, PETROV and BOSHIROV were also under very close surveillance by the UK Security Agencies.

(5) Whilst the ‘Red Bag Couple’ were dining in Zizzi, Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were nearby, drinking in The Bishops Mill. The ‘Red Bag Couple’ were seen at 15:47 hours in The Market Walk. Therefore this puts the two of them very close to the bench, at around the same time the SKRIPALS were suddenly, simultaneously, taken seriously ill.

(6) The two poisoned persons on the bench, in The Maltings, were Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL.

(7) Following the events on that day, the UK Security and UK police Agencies (i.e. MPS-CTC) took actions to seize / edit / hide CCTV video and image evidence so as to ‘post-validate’ the UK State narrative. To assist that process, State Agencies repeatedly asked witnesses to contact them.

(8) The absence of any serious effort to search the area of the 4th March attack (Sergei SKRIPAL’s house, The Maltings, Salisbury Railway Station) was due to the fact that the UK Authorities already knew what had happened – no search was necessary. Public safety was of little concern – indeed mass public casualties would have greatly benefited the UK State’s geo-political goals.

(9) The poisoning of Charlie ROWLEY, and the poisoning and the death of Dawn STURGESS (8th July 2018), appears to have been the result of growing public skepticism of the UK State’s refusal to present any detailed evidence of the way by which Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL could have been subjected to an attack using a “*military-grade nerve agent*”, four months earlier.

(10) Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL, and DS Nick BAILEY, were all poisoned by means of an extremely poisonous mixture (a “*toxic chemical compound*”) consisting of a nerve toxin (possibly a pesticide-type organophosphate) and an opioid (most probably Fentanyl). Whilst the “*high purity Novichok, with no contaminants*” was serendipitously found by the police at the Amesbury poisonings (of Charlie ROWLEY and Dawn STURGESS) .

Any diligent reader of this report will, of course, realize that this analysis does not absolve PETROV and BOSHIROV of any wrongdoing – or even of the possibility that they did, indeed, attempt to assassinate Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL. It does, however, make the already dubious UK State narrative (to that effect) appear even more implausible.

At the time of my releasing this report, the preliminary stages of the independent Dawn STURGESS Inquiry (under the Rt. Hon. Lord Hughes of Ombersley) have been underway for many months – as has the supporting police / security services Operation Verbasco (MPS-CTP, London).⁹⁴

A part of that Inquiry's role – given its independent status – must be to thoroughly, and openly, cross-examine evidence presented by all parties. This includes evidence provided by UK State agencies, and by organizations affiliated to the UK State. Given technical advances in recent years to fabricate false evidence – for example, of 'deep fake' / AI video, images and audio material – that cross examination has to be both rigorous and visible to the general public. Without such procedures in place, there can be no public confidence in the conduct of any independent, judicial process such as the Dawn STURGESS Inquiry. The concern has to be that given the time elapsed (more than 4 years) it may be far too late.

Further research into the Salisbury and Amesbury poisonings will be include, in particular, examinations of that evidence verification process during the Dawn STURGESS Inquiry hearings.

END (# document/photo/video scan pages appended):

⁹⁴ www.dawnsturgess.independent-inquiry.uk

The Inquiry – Setting The State-Stipulated Agenda



INQUEST TOUCHING THE DEATH OF DAWN STURGESS


PROVISIONAL SCOPE

1. The provisional scope of the inquest is as follows:
 - a. The death of Dawn Sturgess
 - i. Dawn Sturgess – pen portrait evidence
 - ii. Events June 2018 to 8 July 2018
 - iii. Medical cause of death
 - iv. Sufficiency of medical treatment
 - b. The poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal
 - i. The events
 - ii. Responsibility for the poisoning
 - (a) Involvement of Alexander Petrov, Ruslan Boshirov and Denis Sergeev
 - (b) The source of the Novichok
 - (c) Russian State responsibility
 - iii. Whether the UK authorities took appropriate precautions in early 2018 to protect Mr Skripal from being attacked.
 - c. Steps taken by UK authorities to ensure public safety following the Skripal poisoning, focusing on the search for any remaining poison – to include relevant aspects of police investigation / public health response
 - d. Connection between the Skripal poisoning and the death of Dawn Sturgess

Route Timeline Analysis, 11:48 to 13:32 hours, 4th March 2018



Shell Garage, Wilton Street, 4th March 2018, 11:59 hrs. PETROV points towards the back-lane 'shortcut'.



PETROV and BOSHIROV: the route to, and from, Sergei SKRIPAL's house

Image sources: Google maps

Route Timeline Analysis, 13:45 hours, 4th March 2018



Bridge Street / Fisherton Street, Looking East



Enlargement. Location of BOSHIROV and PETROV. Corrected time: 13:45 hours.

The Surveillance: Salisbury, 13:45 hours, 4th March 2018



BOSHIROV turns to look back at 'Bobble Hat'.




'Bobble Hat' slowly walks towards The River Walk, still looking at BOSHIROV and PETROV.



BOSHIROV looks back again, towards the bridge area (Bridge Street / The River Walk)

Maltings, Castle St., and Fisherton Rd. – Key Locations / Times – 4th March 2018



Source: Google Maps




Key: **Blue** – Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL; **Red** – PETROV and BOSHIROV

The Construction of a 'Convenient' Poison Package



Recovered 'perfume' packaging

Recovered 'perfume' applicator



Every medic in every country will be needed. In UK & Ireland as much as anywhere. Hand sanitiser is 60 - 70% ethanol, and causes destruction of viruses on skin. 'Jox' (Teva Czech Industries Pharma) Ethanol-iodine 96% destroys Covid-19 where it really matters: the naso-pharynx. (Google 'Jox' Teva Czech Industries Pharma). Every medic should be issued with ethanol-iodine nostril tamponades, behind their masks, to avoid viable Covid-19 ever meeting with pulmonary respiratory cells. Without such nasal slim swatches, medics will be infected & some will die. There'll be 10 pages devoted to this missed opportunity in the 2023 report of 600-pages-length. Ethanol-iodine can, with heavy overuse, damage smell & taste senses. But, used with guidelines of 4mls per 24 hours, it will keep medics upright, for the terrible battle ahead. Pilulka.cz, for 'Jox' Teva ethanol-iodine. **See less**

The Nina Ricci packaging and the glass bottle appears to have been genuine – possibly originating from North America (note the lack of an EU 'estimator' symbol). The replacement nozzle / applicator was made by the JOX company, in the Czech Republic.

Detecting Potential State Political Propaganda Influences

IN THE WILTSHIRE AND SWINDON CORONER'S COURT
BEFORE THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE BARONESS HALLETT DBE
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUEST TOUCHING THE DEATH OF DAWN
STURGESS


**WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL TO THE INQUEST
FOR THE PRE-INQUEST HEARING ON 22 SEPTEMBER 2021**

Introductory

1. This is the second pre-inquest review ("PIR") hearing for the inquest into the death of Ms Dawn Sturgess, who died on 8 July 2018. The first PIR took place earlier this year, on 30 March 2021.
2. The Coroner made a series of directions at the first PIR, and subsequently issued an explanatory ruling dated 8 April 2021. Copies of the directions and the ruling were sent to Interested Persons ("IPs"), and both documents can be found on the inquest website: <https://dawnsturgessinquest.org.uk>.

- c. STI have liaised with the following document providers variously through email, telephone and video correspondence and meetings, with a view to facilitating and progressing disclosure:
 - Operation Verbasco (the joint response of CTPSE, MPS and Thames Valley Police to the inquest)
 - Wiltshire Police
 - GLD
 - Wiltshire Air Ambulance
 - Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust
 - SWASFT
 - Wiltshire Council
 - Bellingcat
 - CPS

The 1st March 2018 CIA (Mike POMPEO) Email, and Correspondence




Source: American Oversight organization, americanoversight.org, documentcloud.org and archive.org

The (above) 1st March 2018 email was an “urgent request” by (it would appear) three (CIA?) persons to “meet urgently” with the (then) CIA Director, Mike POMPEO.⁹⁵ Obviously, that email was in regard to new intelligence that presented a “very promising opportunity” (for the CIA) to exploit. Urgent requests of that kind appear to have been extremely rare.

However, despite that email correspondence having been heavily redacted, a great deal of useful information can be gleaned from both its existence, from the timing, and from the un-redacted content.


⁹⁵ Source: American Oversight organization, americanoversight.org, documentcloud.org and archive.org

The 2nd March 2018 CIA (Mike POMPEO) Email, and Correspondence

Email scans source: American Oversight organization, americanoversight.org, documentcloud.org and archive.org

The significance of the timeline is therefore: (1) the 1st March 'Urgent / Opportunity' email message to CIA Director Mike POMPEO (see previous); and (2) the 2nd March CIA top-level emergency meeting (Mike POMPEO and others) being organized from 05:00 hours local EST time (i.e. 10:00 hours local UK time) – and onwards. And, again, despite having been heavily redacted, much useful information can be gleaned from that email correspondence.

Based on substantive circumstantial analysis, the assessment is therefore that the attendees at that CIA 2nd March emergency meeting (that was presumably held at Langley, VA) will have included (either in person, or via telephone / video conference-call connections): (1) CIA Director Mike POMPEO; (2) CIA Deputy Director Gina HASPEL; and (3) non-identified senior officers, within CIA Clandestine Services. Obviously the meeting would have concerned the need for serious and prompt operational actions by the CIA.

The Salisbury 'Nerve Agent' Poisonings, 4th March 2018

On the afternoon (at approximately 16:00 hours) of the 2nd March 2018 two Russian citizens – Alexander PETROV and Ruslan BOSHROV – arrived in the UK. This occurred some 6 hours after the need was seen for an urgent top-level, CIA emergency meeting at Langley VA (see previous). It is extremely unlikely that this was mere coincidence.

On the 3rd March Yulia SKRIPAL arrived in the UK (at approximately 14:40 hours), and was met by her father Sergei SKRIPAL and Sergei's close friend Ross CASSIDY. Notably, CASSIDY subsequently insisted that they were followed by two people (a man and a woman) in a black BMW, on the drive back to Salisbury from Heathrow Airport.

On the 4th March, PETROV and BOSHROV met with Sergei SKRIPAL for a 1 hour 20 minute meeting at Sergei SKRIPAL's house in Salisbury. During their visit to Salisbury, on that day, PETROV and BOSHROV can be seen (from analysis of released CCTV recordings) to have been under very close surveillance by at least two persons (at least one on foot). PETROV and BOSHROV were clearly aware (albeit seemingly unconcerned) that they were being followed.

Some 2 hours after PETROV and BOSHROV had taken a train back to London, Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL were found, collapsed on a park bench in central Salisbury, after having been poisoned by a "toxic chemical compound".⁹⁶

⁹⁶ See: www.darklake-synectics.co.uk/docs/inquiry_2018_salisbury.pdf

The Presumed Principal CIA Actors (1st / 2nd March 2018)

Mike POMPEO – CIA Director (March 2018)



Gina HASPEL – CIA Deputy Director (March 2018)



Michael RAOILE – CIA London Chief (March 2018)



Daniel HOFFMAN – CIA Clandestine Services

At the time of the 1st / 2nd March 2018 CIA emails, Gina HASPEL was the CIA Deputy Director – whilst Michael RAOILE was the CIA London Station Chief (serving in that position from 2017 to 2020),

Previously Gina HASPEL had been the London Station Chief over two separate periods – 2008 to 2011, and 2014 to 2017. This therefore covered the period from when Sergei SKRIPAL was (following the 9th July 2010 US / UK / RF spy-swap) released from Russian prison and had moved to the UK (Salisbury) – through to just one year before the poisonings of Sergei and Yulia SKRIPAL in Salisbury.

That 2010 spy-swap was carried out under the auspices of the CIA Moscow Station Chief Daniel HOFFMAN. Both Daniel HOFFMAN and Gina HASPEL had been employed in senior positions of the CIA Clandestine Services section at the same time, and are reported to have been close (working) friends.

Given the above, it is seen as highly likely that HASPEL, HOFFMAN and RAOILE will all have taken a keen personal interest in Sergei SKRIPAL's exile within the UK – that, therefore, they all will have known of his increasing personal isolation (in regard to the death of his mother, and of his son), and of the rumors of his wish to finally go back to Russia. And, most especially, there can be little doubt that they will have been aware of Sergei SKRIPAL's admiration for Vladimir PUTIN (in regard to events in Ukraine, especially) and of his support for the Russian annexation of Crimea.⁹⁷

Undoubtedly, such sentiments – and especially when expressed by an important figure such as Sergei SKRIPAL – will have been seen as not only totally abhorrent by the upper echelons of the US political / military establishment, but as a serious threat (albeit one of many) to the global ambitions of Washington DC State Apparatus.

On the 13th March 2018 the promotion of Mike POMPEO to the position of US Secretary of State was announced – as was (subsequently) the promotion of Gina HASPEL from CIA Deputy Director to the top position of CIA Director. The promotion of Gina HASPEL to CIA Director was not without a considerable amount of controversy.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ As reported by BBC journalist Mark URBAN. And as cited in: www.darklake-synectics.co.uk/docs/inquiry_2018_salisbury.pdf

⁹⁸ Over the last five years there have been widespread allegations that, during her years as a senior figure within the CIA, Gina HASPEL had had a leading role in the CIA's use of enhanced interrogation (torture) at (at least one) CIA black site, and of the use by the CIA of extraordinary rendition to such sites. For example: (1) 'Declassified cables reveal CIA torture at site once run by now chief Gina Haspel – News', Andrew Buncombe, The Independent on Sunday, 11th August 2018; (2) 'CIA nominee Haspel declines to condemn torture as "immoral" – WORLD | WEEK IN REVIEW', The Financial Times, 12th May 2018; (3) 'Concerns were raised over ill-treatment of detainees', Amrit Singh (Senior Lawyer, Open Society Justice Initiative, New York), Letters page, Financial Times, 24th March 2018; (4) 'CIA deputy supervised jail torture', Michael Evans, The Times, 4th February 2017.

END of Report

[Note: Original sources are listed as footnotes at the bottom of each page. Endnotes are not used. URL references are not hyper-linked in this report. Photos and image scans (including that of documents, *et cetera*) are included solely in the context of (and as appropriate to) the research content of this report, for illustrative and substantiation purposes only.]